What Economics is Not: An Economist's Response to Rosenberg

Douglas Wade Hands

14 citations0/0 files storedPhilosophy of Science

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Philosophy and History of Science Economic Theory and Institutions Philosophy, Science, and History

Abstract

Alexander Rosenberg (1983) has argued, contrary to his previous work in the philosophy of economics, that economicsis notscience, and itismerely mathematics. The following paper argues that Rosenberg fails to demonstrate either of these two claims. The questions of the predictive weakness of modern economics and the cognitive standing of abstract economic theory are discussed in detail.

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References

1954Essays in Positive Economics 1982A General Theory of Exploitation and Class 1983Beyond Positivism: Economic Methodology in the Twentieth Century 1981The Methodology of Economics.1983The foundations of economic method 2016A Critique of Friedman's Critics 1981On the Futility of Criticizing the Neoclassical Maximization Hypothesis 1976Microeconomic Laws

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1986What Rosenberg's Philosophy of Economics is Not 1987Falsificationism and Fallibilism as Epistemic Foundations of Economics: A Critical View

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