Article2006

Generalizing the Lottery Paradox

112 citations0/0 files storedThe British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

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Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics Philosophical Ethics and Theory Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge

Abstract

This paper is concerned with formal solutions to the lottery paradox on which high probability defeasibly warrants acceptance. It considers some recently proposed solutions of this type and presents an argument showing that these solutions are trivial in that they boil down to the claim that perfect probability is sufficient for rational acceptability. The argument is then generalized, showing that a broad class of similar solutions faces the same problem. 1. An argument against some formal solutions to the lottery paradox2. The argument generalized3. Some variations4. Adding modalities5. Anticipated objections

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References

2002Knowledge and its Limits 1973A Treatise on Probability 1970Henry E. KyburgJr. , Probability and the logic of rational belief. Wesleyan University Press, Middletown, Conn., 1961, x + 350 pp.1986What are logical notions?1978PSA 1978 : proceedings of the 1978 biennial meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 2007Measuring coherence 1996The epistemic virtues of consistency

Cited by

2008Assertion, Moore, and Bayes 2019How Belief-Credence Dualism Explains Away Pragmatic Encroachment 2011The Psychological Basis of the Harman-Vogel Paradox 2020Credence: A Belief-First Approach 2017Impossibility Results for Rational Belief 2007The evidential support theory of conditionals 2021Four Arguments for Denying that Lottery Beliefs Are Justified 2015Lotteries and justification

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