Self-Regulation of Cognitive Inference and Decision Processes

Roy Frederick Baumeister · Leonard S. Newman

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Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics Social and Intergroup Psychology Clinical Reasoning and Diagnostic Skills

Abstract

Mechanisms for controlling inference processes are analyzed according to the models of intuitive scientist (who desires optimal, accurate conclusions) and intuitive lawyer (who desires predetermined, particular conclusions), using a step model of the inference process. The first step, gathering evidence, can be regulated by moving the termination point and by looking in particular places for evidence. The second step, drawing immediate implications from bits of evidence, is presumably automatic and hence relatively immune to regulation. The third step, assessing implications, can override or discredit implications of specific pieces of evidence, and it can be used to regulate inference through combating bias or through attacking and discrediting unwanted implications. The final step, involving integration of assorted evidence and implications, can be regulated by manipulating decision rules and criteria.

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References

1975Belief, Attitude, Intention and Behavior: An Introduction to Theory and Research 1957A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance 1990The case for motivated reasoning.1982Judgment under Uncertainty 1973On the psychology of prediction.1982Judgment under uncertainty: Causality and attribution 1981Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgment.1992Motivated skepticism: Use of differential decision criteria for preferred and nonpreferred conclusions.

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