Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism.

Frank M. Jackson · Christopher S. Hill

200 citations0/0 files storedThe Philosophical Review

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Philosophy and Theoretical Science Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics

Abstract

Preface Part I. Introduction: 1. Topics and themes Part II. The Mind-Body Problem: 2. The failings of dualism and the double-aspect theory 3. The failings of functionalism 4. In defense of type materialism Part III. Introspection: 5. Introspective awareness of sensations 6. Introspection and the skeptic Part IV. Sensory Concepts: 7. Concepts of bodily sensations: Their semantic properties 8. Concepts of visual sensations: Their content and their deployment Part V. Other Minds: 9. Knowledge of other minds 10. Unity of consciousness, other minds, and phenomenal space Index.

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