Strategic Corporate Tax Lobbying

Janet A. Meade · Shihong Li

25 citations0/0 files storedJournal of the American Taxation Association

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Corporate Taxation and Avoidance Economic and Fiscal Studies Political Influence and Corporate Strategies

Abstract

ABSTRACT We investigate the motivation for and outcome of corporate participation in shaping tax policy via lobbying. We posit that generally tax-sophisticated firms lobby on tax issues and that their motives for doing so are either to obtain a tax benefit or to avoid losing one. We label these motives as strategic and defensive tax lobbying, respectively, and we empirically investigate whether strategic lobbying yields a measurable reduction in future tax rates. Using a proxy measure of strategic tax lobbying, we find a significant and negative relation between our measure and future cash ETRs. Alternative specifications of our primary model produce similar results.

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References

2001Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data 1965The Logic of Collective Action 1966The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups.1971The Theory of Economic Regulation 1985Positive Accounting Theory 1997Industry costs of equity 2021The Theory of Economic Regulation 1976Toward a More General Theory of Regulation

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