Should Regulators Reveal Information About Banks

Yaron Leitner

18 citations0/0 files storedRePEc: Research Papers in Economics

No readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.

No open-access location is known for this record yet.

Literature note Cite in a project Citation map

Banking stability, regulation, efficiency Global Financial Regulation and Crises finance, banking, and market dynamics

Abstract

Regulators collect and produce information about banks. This information helps regulators monitor the safety and soundness of the banking system, and it also helps policymakers preserve financial stability. A key issue is whether this information should be made public and, if so, to what extent. In this article, we will explore some of the tradeoffs involved.

Paper brief

Loading…

Cite this work

Citation unavailable for this work.

BibTeX RIS CSL-JSON

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Citations in this library

Citation map →

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 18 citations exist upstream.

References

1936The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money.1936The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, by John Maynard Keynes 2002Social Value of Public Information 1978The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward to Inventive Activity 2007Efficient Use of Information and Social�Value�of�Information 2005Financial Networks: Contagion, Commitment, and Private Sector Bailouts 2014Should Banks’ Stress Test Results be Disclosed? An Analysis of the Costs and Benefits 2015Government Intervention and Information Aggregation by Prices

Cited by

2024Transparency and bank runs

Imported from OpenAlex (CC0) — nothing here is generated.