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JOB MARKET SIGNALING OF RELATIVE POSITION, OR BECKER MARRIED TO SPENCE
16 references·1 citing·43 second hop
JOB MARKET SIGNALING OF RELATIVE POSITION, OR BECKER MARRIED TO SPENCE (2011)JOB MARKET SIGNALING OF RELATIVE POSITION…Microeconomic analysis (2022)Microeconomic analysisBeauty Is a Beast, Frog Is a Prince: Assortative Matching with Nontransferabilities (2007)Beauty Is a Beast, Frog Is a …Contest architecture (2005)Contest architectureRunning to Keep in the Same Place: Consumer Choice as a Game of Status (2004)Running to Keep in the Same P…The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics (2002)The Economist as Engineer: Ga…Assortative Matching and Search (2000)Assortative Matching and Sear…The Frame of Reference as a Public Good (1997)The Frame of Reference as a P…Design Innovation and Fashion Cycles (1993)Design Innovation and Fashion…Social Norms, Savings Behavior, and Growth (1992)Social Norms, Savings Behavio…Incentive Compatibility in Signaling Games with a Continuum of Types (1987)Incentive Compatibility in Si…Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts (1981)Rank-Order Tournaments as Opt…Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts (1979)Rank-Order Tournaments as Opt…The Theory of Screening, Education, and the Distribution of Income (1975)The Theory of Screening, Educ…Competitive and optimal responses to signals: An analysis of efficiency and distribution (1974)Competitive and optimal respo…Job Market Signaling (1973)Job Market SignalingA Theory of Marriage: Part I (1973)A Theory of Marriage: Part IPreference Signaling in Matching Markets (2013)Preference Signaling in Match…Assignment Problems and the Location of Economic Activities (1957)World Revolution and Family Patterns. (1964)Shadow Prices, Market Wages, and Labor Supply (1974)Marriage and Household Decision-Making: A Bargaining Analysis (1980)A Theory of Marriage Timing (1988)Collective Labor Supply and Welfare (1992)A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth (1956)Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth (1986)On the mechanics of economic development (1988)Individual preferences for political redistribution (2002)Fairness and Redistribution (2005)Culture: An Empirical Investigation of Beliefs, Work, and Fertility (2009)The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism (1970)An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation (1971)Hockey Helmets, Concealed Weapons, and Daylight Saving (1973)JOB MARKET SIGNALING **The essay is based on the author's doctoral dissertation (“Market Signalling: The Informational Structure of Job Markets and Related Phenomena,” Ph.D. thesis, Harvard University, 1972), forthcoming as a book entitled Market Signaling: Information Transfer in Hinng and Related Screening Processes in the Harvard Economic Studies Series, Harvard University Press. The aim here is to present the outline of the signaling model and some of its conclusions. Generalizations of the numerical examples used for expositional purposes here are found in ibid, and elsewhere. (1978)Innovation and Communication: Signalling with Partial Disclosure (1983)Fostering Parasocial Relationships with Celebrities on Social Media: Implications for Celebrity Endorsement (2017)A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding (1982)Equilibrium Unemployment Theory (1991)Changes in Unemployment and Wage Inequality: An Alternative Theory and Some Evidence (1999)The company of strangers: a natural history of economic life (2004)Early Marriage, Age of Menarche, and Female Schooling Attainment in Bangladesh (2008)COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS (1961)College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage (1962)Optimal Auction Design (1981)Pairwise kidney exchange (2005)The New York City High School Match (2005)The Combinatorial Assignment Problem: Approximate Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes (2011)Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization (1996)Performance Pay and Productivity (2000)Information Reliability and a Theory of Financial Intermediation (1984)The Role of the State in Financial Markets (1993)Cumulative Advantage/Disadvantage and the Life Course: Cross-Fertilizing Age and Social Science Theory (2003)What's the difference? diversity constructs as separation, variety, or disparity in organizations (2007)The Fundamental Institutions of China's Reforms and Development (2011)Top Incomes in the Long Run of History (2011)Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information (1976)Varieties of Capitalism (2001)Signaling Theory: A Review and Assessment (2010)Evaluating the cost-efficiency of the Italian banking system: What can be learned from the joint application of parametric and non-parametric techniques (1997)Returns to scale in different DEA models (2003)A Common Nomenclature for Stated Preference Elicitation Approaches (2011)
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References

  • 1973Job Market Signaling16,329 cited
  • 1981Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts4,568 cited
  • 1973A Theory of Marriage: Part I3,566 cited
  • 1979Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts3,033 cited
  • 1975The Theory of Screening, Education, and the Distribution of Income1,363 cited
  • 2002The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics1,006 cited
  • 2022Microeconomic analysis796 cited
  • 1974Competitive and optimal responses to signals: An analysis of efficiency and distribution795 cited
  • 2000Assortative Matching and Search768 cited
  • 1992Social Norms, Savings Behavior, and Growth626 cited
  • 2004Running to Keep in the Same Place: Consumer Choice as a Game of Status516 cited
  • 1997The Frame of Reference as a Public Good477 cited
  • 1993Design Innovation and Fashion Cycles329 cited
  • 2005Contest architecture294 cited
  • 1987Incentive Compatibility in Signaling Games with a Continuum of Types273 cited
  • 2007Beauty Is a Beast, Frog Is a Prince: Assortative Matching with Nontransferabilities

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  • 2013Preference Signaling in Matching Markets87 cited