Public Support for Tax Evasion: Self-interest or Symbolic Politics?

Abstract

Abstract The literature suggests two major theoretical explanations for public resistance to taxation. The first emphasizes a cognitive, instrumental, utility-maximizing response to objective elements of taxation and government spending. The second treats contemporary tax revolts as the result of more enduring ideological predispositions, disaffection from politics in general and the result of social mobilization by anti-government protagonists. In this article we confront the self-interest model and the symbolic politics model with empirical evidence at both the aggregate level and at the micro-level. In the macro-analysis we examine the relationship between the level of taxation and the acceptance of tax cheating in twelve Western nations; in the micro-analysis we perform a more detailed study of Norway, employing survey data. The over-all results clearly show the strongest support for the symbolic politics model, while the self-interest explanation is only weakly supported by the data. An important finding is that political attitudes and values have their strongest and most consistent impact among the politically uninvolved. This result further substantiates the symbolic politics model.

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