Bas van Fraassen on Scientific Representation

Abstract

Representation is a heavily history-laden philosophical term. If we are to follow Martin Heidegger in Die Zeit des Weltbilds, our manner of conceiving natural beings underwent a major ontological shift at the dawn of modern times. Whereas the middle-age construed beings as created by God, the modern era saw them as represented by us. For a modern thinker, to know is to (correctly) represent. For a scientist a being is an object amenable to mathematical representation.1 This momentous historical turn opened the path to the tremendous success of modern science, but at the unbearable price of losing contact with reality along the way. A representation is always a purported representation of something. Thus, it presupposes a representor and a represented. Two main problems arise here. First, how can the representor represent what is represented? Second, since we are immediately only acquainted with ‘observable phenomena’ what reasons have we to believe that a representor correctly hits on something real? In his latest book Scientific representation: Paradoxes of Perspective, Bas van Fraassen does not rest satisfied with the merit of addressing these daunting – yet central – philosophical problems head-on, but he also offers exciting and carefully argued solutions to them. To tackle the first problem, van Fraassen takes his clue from art and the notion of perspective which he submits to detailed scrutiny. He then contends that the second problem is dissolved by resorting to pragmatics. Although I am by and large sympathetic with van Fraassen’s views on representation, I am more reluctant to embrace his proposed pragmatic dissolution which, as far as I understand, depends upon the acceptance of what Michel Foucault appropriately called the épistèmè de la representation. As I see it, the major philosophical challenge here is to free ourselves from the view that knowing is representing, a view that opens an unbridgeable chasm between our representations and things. After having approvingly quoted Goodman’s question ‘when is art?’ (21), van Fraassen asks ‘when is representation?’ Just as Goodman’s ambition was not to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for what counts as art, van Fraassen doesn’t aim at coining a definition or a theory of representation, but to highlight some ‘family resemblances’ (and differences) in various forms of representation. Certainly, resemblance between A and B is not sufficient to qualify A as a representation of B, if only because there is no representation without someone using A to represent B. But is resemblance a necessary condition for representation? This issue is important and subtle enough to deserve close examination. Take van Fraassen’s example of Spott’s drawing of Bismarck (14) as a peacock, which is used as a representation of him as vainglorious. In order to function as a representation of Bismarck – in a given context – the caricature pictures some of his physical features. Such a resemblance allows us to identify the target (B) of the caricature (A), namely Bismarck (and not Radowitz). So far so good, but the aim of the caricaturist is that we not see A as a faithful portrait of Bismarck but as a caricature, that is as representing (in this case) a person having a specific trait of character, namely vanity, a property which is (in our culture) symbolically associated with peacocks. How is this aim achieved? van Fraassen aptly insists that for the caricature to achieve its purpose some distorting of Bismarck’s physical features is necessary (Bismarck’s arms are replaced by wings, his chest looks like a long neck…). In other words, the caricature is a misrepresentation. But notice that A misrepresents only with respect to the improbable event that it is taken to be a resembling portrait. On the other hand, the caricature does (ironically for sure) aim at representing a vainglorious Bismarck, just in the same way as a picture of a red apple can successfully represent a red apple, in the appropriate context. To put it shortly, the caricature is a representation of Bismarck on the basis of some physical resemblances with him but it represents him as vainglorious because the drawing of Bismarck includes features that resemble a peacock to which vanity is symbolically associated. From the discussion of several examples, van Fraassen draws what he calls the Hauptsatz of his conception of representation: ‘There is no representation except in the sense that some things are used, made or taken, to represent some things as thus or so’ (23). A represents B only for a user X in a proper context C: the representational relation is a four-place relation. A consequence of this is that anything can in principle function as a representation of something. There are no intrinsic characteristics of A and B that ipso facto make A the representation of B. This indeed is a healthy lesson to be learned from the consideration of representation in art, a lesson that can fruitfully be exported to the study scientific representation. Notice that the Haupsatz does not entail that resemblance is to be jettisoned altogether from an elucidation of representation. Evidently, many a representation trades for its success on selected resemblances that are deemed relevant for the user in a certain context. On this van Fraassen distances himself from Goodman according to whom representing is denoting. Granted, resemblance or likeness is not required for a word to successfully denote a given thing. But again, is some resemblance a necessary condition for successful representation? I agree that it is not. However, the broader notion of structural similarity does provide a necessary condition for representation. For A to represent B, they must both be seen (by a user) as systems, that is as sets of elements which stand in some relations among themselves. It is reasonable to suppose that to be a system is an intrinsic characteristic of a thing: to see some targeted thing B as having property P does not imply that we must be agnostic about the possessing of P by B. We have come here to a very general – therefore weak – condition, which only requires that two things possess some relational structure for one to be able to represent the other. A representation always involves a mapping between A and B that preserves some selected relations. If two elements of B stand in some relevant relation, then some corresponding elements of A stand in a corresponding relation as well. This is what is meant by structural similarity which is accurately captured in mathematics by the notions of isomorphism (when we have a one-one correspondence between the elements of A and B) or homomorphism (in the case of many-one correspondence). The condition of structural (relevant) similarity does not impose any likeness constraints in the sense that elements of A and B must share some properties (e.g. to have a colour) or that some relations in A must be like some relations in B (e.g. be spatial). For example, spatial arrangements of black lines and patches can be used to represent temporal sequences of musical notes. van Fraassen certainly agrees that structural similarity is a necessary criterion for scientific representation. But I am not quite sure that he would accept structural similarity as a necessary requirement for all forms of representation in domains such as art (admittedly, only when art is meant to be representational), caricature etc. Nevertheless, even in the event of misrepresentation, the discussion of Bismarck’s caricature shows that the success of representing him as vainglorious trades on some structural similarity between the arrangement of pictorial elements on the one hand, and Bismarck and peacocks, on the other hand. Be it as it may, elucidating the nature of representation in caricature and art is supposed to shed light on scientific representation, which is the main purpose of the book after all, and should not mislead us in attempting to explain obscurum per obscurius. Besides drawing our attention to the importance of relevant similarity, context and user, the examination of caricatures shows that success in representing is distinct from truth. Bismarck’s caricature succeeds in representing him as vainglorious irrespective of whether he really is or is not vainglorious or whether he existed or not. ‘Fundamental to the understanding of representation in all contexts is this fact, that images which represent something unreal have their importance, their role, their effect in the context in which they function’ (35). Now, the user may ask: is the representation faithful (in some relevant respects) to something real? Then, the user may state a proposition exposed to the risk of falsity. In itself a representation is never true or false. We might consider adding a green flag or a cross when a representation is meant to be true. By doing this however, we have constructed a different representation, which again has to be interpreted by a user in a proper context, and so forth (31). Thus, it must be stressed that a representation is not a proposition, and the converse is not true either. I think that van Fraassen agrees that a representation is not a proposition, but he disagrees with the converse (16). I claim – and I’m aware that this is highly controversial – that language does not represent the world, but describes it, correctly or incorrectly. In his Tractatus, Wittgenstein famously argued in favour of the ‘picture theory of meaning’ according to which propositions can be analysed into truth-functions of elementary statements that are logical images of atomic facts. When an elementary statement is true, it represents a fact with the same logical form: the arrangement of names in the elementary proposition is the same as the arrangement of the corresponding simple objects in the fact. Whether true or false, the proposition represents a possible situation in logical space. Wittgenstein, the logical positivists and van Fraassen alike are wary to avoid any form of mentalism and psychologism (24). Representations and possible situations in the logical space are not psychological entities, let alone mental images or ideas. As we all know too well, the picture theory of meaning was later rejected by Wittgenstein himself. True, a propositional sign – a string of strokes drawn on paper, say – is an artefact which can be used as a representation, since anything can be used to represent anything. Thus, we can always construct some homomorphism between a propositional sign and a possible situation. But if a sign is a propositional sign, it means that it is employed by a user with some illocutionary force, something that a representation is lacking. A used proposition must have some illocutionary force, e.g. assertion, and may be true or false. Language describes (correctly or wrongly) the world but does not represent it. As the of his book perspective is to van Fraassen’s understanding of representation. In things are first seen at the spatial of a looks in a certain Second, the picture is constructed in with The first a of any successful representation, namely its or by its For a picture to represent its user must know the to and the of the with respect to the things represented in the The is at the of of certain lines which not to the picture itself and he looks in a the of the user can the of the from intrinsic elements – namely the – of the I think it is important to in that the user and the are not The of the is at the of some lines which from the thing – a say – and cross the of the To successfully the picture as a representation, the user must be able to with respect to the picture and to the and of the of the The user can of with respect to the But is must be able to the of the in order to on the objects The have the and constructed representation. This of the shows that things are always seen from a certain and this fact draws our attention to the – not – which is a of success for any representational The of representation is by van Fraassen’s discussion of In order to I must first with respect to the which would a of of any as van Fraassen I on the by means of a cross and of at But then I would have constructed a would a of to or these to an using an of a is to the one with respect to a representor represent itself as a The be into the and this true for representation. The second of representation that the of perspective to light is the about things represented that the user can from the Such is by means of some the important of which is the cross If the if perspective the cross between on some lines the This the user to of certain of the represented or but does not to the (in of the For van to construct a picture is to a A picture is a of a a of by relations. In a van Fraassen as far as that is a representation the converse is not the of representation, and are at a certain to be of as on resemblances in just the way that is representing and the are a of representor which includes features that can be in mathematical necessary and are by no means involves a case of A of pictures with of on the of the of representation is on might be to claim that the representation a drawing of a its But it is to at the very of his van Fraassen an and between and be ‘observable is in be the of or The and representations different about the The picture shows how the is seen by a given and also some on the on the other the picture on its The of is the of if we identify the with the the representation looks more – and also more reality – the representation. But not too things are In fact, a picture at representing the object as a picture represents the object as having specific target the same but are different In the representation however, the – and also the user – is from the This is quite of the way modern in attempting to a from is a more appropriate here view from that of any of the Whereas in and distinct is made to the and to the user, such is and thus in the case of the or physical of thus is a of all but and which can be no picture can represent without by a If the way of representing is deemed to be more it is first because no is made to a Second, we can construct a representation of the from the one by using the of but not the other way the same representation of a can be constructed of the basis of and it does not make sense to construct pictures of things as The representation is more with respect to various of to things. of example of the in However, a picture and a representation of a are both and also of certain of the This can be are representations and which possess some of with respect to some of in is in all scientific in and in the general theory of are for the of of us to the second main problem by van namely the between our representations and Scientific aim at representing This as a in van Fraassen’s of However, representation can only between things that to the same for a representation of a target to be possible at all, we have to what I an by which a is seen as a The first problem that is to the relation between the of this – which I the structure – and the which is not that we are immediately acquainted with a A structure possible be the of the of the of the that we can (correctly or to be or not on the basis of The second is to construct a mathematical of this In the case of the we the of the by means of to or that can be by means of the is or relation. By we have constructed a made of in a The second problem is how we the between the and the van Fraassen attention to both He the first with a The of the second problem is other the of at by the of logical and which I consider The problem here is to construct an homomorphism between two or two since the of the structure is the of an – – us follow van Fraassen in his of historical of the of we are in a – – of things as and The structure is a of things with a by the relation is or as as Then, the between and the way representing the structure by means of a structure elements are a of to this structure is van Fraassen the importance of the historical context in which an in of as as some of are A is an artefact the of a to the since the of the are to be more a must provide that are of the of various and of conditions as in This is an does does to the In fact, we have the the structure of the various (e.g. of the and the in Such a not between a such as and some but between The that is the structure of and the structure of are to the structure of and various of the same for van there is no property such as that and which is by our one a detailed theory is in whether or not the of a of the except by of a a theory which the itself as as the and the Thus, in the case of the theory the which then was as what was by the what the theory is not a of reality on which but a structure of to to of When this is we are in a to claim that have in The mathematical and the they are to elements of in the sense that they are satisfied by to In this in the of is by to the We are in a to tackle the of can an such as a mathematical represent something that is not something in This question on the between and but it must also be at a more what is the between a structure and the A lesson to be drawn from the and on which I not too is that a representation is always a representation of a Thus, we never represent but their our representations – and very at – about How can this at this some on it true that a certain has some specific of van Fraassen that statements are true or of our psychological of But what reasons have we to believe that a has a because we have constructed – in with – a representation of some structure from the But the of such a on some about with respect to which our of a representation so to of all, we must identify some as or We on true that we may such as is a Then, we have statements such as is this other the of which is on the basis of which I identify with and true statements that them are the on which all statements of this relation is a not on representation. When we a property by a to a we not represent the thing as possessing a a is (and this is not the to into this it does not state a between a property on the one and a thing on the other (and a relation between an in and a It must be that in a there is no chasm between a representation and a because there is no representation, The representational from things and statements about them that consider some properties and relations in as being in order to construct a Then, the representational takes its with the of such as and so But this way of the between the and our representations of it. I agree with van Fraassen that we to the of a property such as that in the in order to for the of the statement is if in of we that it is our is true or in of something which is in some sense of us. of the nature of this of and the of that may between our and this would us too far Such an would be the aim of a correspondence theory of truth. The to all correspondence of is that there is something there – at – that is relevant to the and of our which as van Fraassen it, our to what we are aware of In this I accept that true in which our are have that corresponding that make them true. that van Fraassen the reality of correspondence and yet that represent how does he in with to – by some – van Fraassen to For us the that the theory is to the and the claim that it is to the as as represented by are indeed the If we believe that we are of our then (B) and would indeed us into the of pragmatic This would be to that is but I believe it. However, I’m when I that some elements of meant to represent the phenomena’ This certainly is in van Fraassen’s a theory is a of some of which – its – are to more accurately But this doesn’t to very with his between and To are not Thus, the is not the same as being in with the because can be and in different In other words, are various on the same but perspective does on some similarity in stru

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