Rawls's “Political” Philosophy and American Democracy

Abstract

John Rawls has recently argued that political philosophy can significantly contribute to making democratic societies stable. He seeks moral principles that can ground what he calls anoverlapping consensusand argues that his well-known principles of justice can serve in this capacity. I criticize both Rawls's general claims about the role of political philosophy and his particular defense of the principles of justice. Both arguments commit Rawls to specific empirical claims about existing liberal societies that are highly questionable. In particular, the Kantian moral views that Rawls believes to be central to liberal culture are controverted by extensive empirical research on the actual beliefs of liberal citizens. Despite the problems with Rawls's arguments, I suggest that a rather different overlapping consensus appears to contribute to stable democracies. This centers on support of the political system rather than more substantive moral principles.

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