Incentive Conflicts, Bundling Claims, and the Interaction among Financial Claimants

Chester S. Spatt · Frederic P. Sterbenz

15 citations0/0 files storedThe Journal of Finance

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Corporate Finance and Governance Corporate Insolvency and Governance Stochastic processes and financial applications

Abstract

ABSTRACT We show that for certain capital structures equity has an incentive to buy out another claim and alter the firm's investment strategy so as to maximize the combined value of equity and the acquired claim. This restructuring may reintroduce agency problems into capital structures which appear to avoid agency conflicts. By bundling claims, it is possible to avoid this agency problem. The agency problem is also eliminated by dispersed ownership of the claims.

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