ENDOGENOUS ELECTION TIMING IN MAJORITARIAN PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEMS*

Alastair Michael Smith

63 citations0/0 files storedEconomics and Politics

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Electoral Systems and Political Participation Fiscal Policies and Political Economy Game Theory and Voting Systems

Abstract

The election date is an endogenous choice in many parliamentary systems. This paper explores when governments call elections and how the timing of an election influences the electoral result. Governments have an incentive to behave opportunistically, calling elections at a time when they are performing well. However, the choice of election date reveals information about the government. Specifically, early elections indicate that a government has little faith in its ability to perform well in the future. The analysis is expanded to consider changes in government composition, political business cycles, informational asymmetries and the role of opposition campaigning.

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References

1958An Economic Theory of Democracy.1950Equilibrium points in n -person games 1975The Political Business Cycle 1959The Theory of Committees and Elections.1983A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model 1981A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural-Rate Model 1964Political Parties Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State 1987Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles

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