References

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• 1973The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities29,064 cited
• 1983Separation of Ownership and Control19,446 cited
• 1964CAPITAL ASSET PRICES: A THEORY OF MARKET EQUILIBRIUM UNDER CONDITIONS OF RISK*19,431 cited
• 1960The Problem of Social Cost18,243 cited
• 1970EFFICIENT CAPITAL MARKETS: A REVIEW OF THEORY AND EMPIRICAL WORK*15,723 cited
• 1970Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work13,616 cited
• 1952PORTFOLIO SELECTION*13,480 cited
• 1977Determinants of corporate borrowing13,160 cited
• 1980Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm10,540 cited
• 1965The Valuation of Risk Assets and the Selection of Risky Investments in Stock Portfolios and Capital Budgets7,600 cited
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• 1975THE VALUATION OF RISK ASSETS AND THE SELECTION OF RISKY INVESTMENTS IN STOCK PORTFOLIOS AND CAPITAL BUDGETS**This paper is another in a series of interrelated theoretical and statistical studies of corporate financial and investment policies being made under grants from the Rockefeller Foundation, and more recently the Ford Foundation, to the Harvard Business School. The generous support for this work is most gratefully acknowledged. The author is also much indebted to his colleagues Professors Bishop, Christenson, Kahr, Raiffa, and (especially) Schlaifer, for extensive discussion and commentary on an earlier draft of this paper; but responsibility for any errors or imperfections remains strictly his own.[Professor Sharpe's paper, “Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium Under Conditions of Risk” (Journal of Finance, September 1964) appeared after this paper was in final form and on its way to the printers. My first section, which parallels the first half of his paper (with corresponding conclusions), sets the algebraic framework for sections II, III and VI, (which have no counterpart in his paper) and for section IV on the equilibrium prices of risk assets, concerning which our results differ significantly for reasons which will be explored elsewhere. Sharpe does not take up the capital budgeting problem developed in section V below.]