Choice architecture: A review of why nudge: The politics of libertarian paternalism

Abstract

Sunstein argues for an exception to John Stuart Mill's principle that government should never interfere with a person's freedom of choice for the person's “own good” unless that choice will harm others. If a particular government‐imposed contingency is soft rather than harsh, if it acts on means rather than ends, if all alternatives remain available, and if the person herself would ultimately have chosen the alternative now made less costly, more salient, or easier to obtain, then that governmental control is a nudge, and for Sunstein nudges are permissible. Sunstein couches his recommendations in a dichotomy between two internal processes (System 1 and System 2) corresponding to areas of the brain governing fast, intuitive thinking and slow, analytic thinking. Nudges nudge people in a direction governed by System 2. This internalization and dichotomization of what is essentially a continuum between long‐term, more abstract contingencies and short‐term, less abstract contingencies may divert the reader's attention away from the contingencies themselves. Such diversion, if it were taken seriously, would hinder the development of effective and at the same time gentle nudges. Fortunately, none of the nudges proposed by Sunstein depend on the “psychology” represented by System 1 and System 2. The book remains focused on choice architecture. The behavioristic reader can easily translate from neurocognitive to behavioral terms and so see nudges as means of bringing behavior under the control of wide and abstract reinforcer contingencies.

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