HOW TO PLAY GAMES? NASH VERSUS BERGE BEHAVIOUR RULES

Pierre Courtois · Rabia Nessah · Tarik Tazdaït

25 citations0/0 files storedEconomics and Philosophy

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Game Theory and Applications Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation

Abstract

Abstract: Assuming that in order to best achieve their goal, individuals adapt their behaviour to the game situation, this paper examines the appropriateness of the Berge behaviour rule and equilibrium as a complement to Nash. We define a Berge equilibrium and explain what it means to play in this fashion. We analyse the rationale of individuals playing in a situational manner, and establish an operational approach that describes the circumstances under which the same individual might play in one fashion versus another.

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1950Equilibrium points in n -person games 198611. Reasons and Persons 1995A cognitive-affective system theory of personality: Reconceptualizing situations, dispositions, dynamics, and invariance in personality structure.2003Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction 2015Games and Decisions 19952. Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research 2001Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment 1987Morals by Agreement

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