Social Projection as a Source of Cooperation

Abstract

Social dilemmas, such as the prisoner’s dilemma, are often seen as a conflict between rational self-interest and a moral concern for the collective. Contrary to empirical fact, classic game theory says that cooperative behavior cannot occur, and theories of moral sentiment fail to explain how cooperation comes about. Social projection theory offers a fresh look. Seeing decision making as a matter of general inductive reasoning, the theory explains why cooperative behavior occurs, correctly predicts that cooperation will vary with changes in the payoff structure, and shows how a group of self-interested individuals can obtain socially desirable outcomes. Within clearly specified boundary conditions, the theory suggests ways in which social outcomes can be improved beyond current levels.

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