What limits escalation?—Varying threat power in an ultimatum experimentGerlinde Fellner-Röhling, Werner Güth2003-05-19articleEconomics Letters52 citationsclosedNo readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.Experimental Behavioral Economics StudiesDecision-Making and Behavioral EconomicsSocial Power and Status DynamicsAbstractNo abstract was published for this record.Citations in this libraryStored only when both papers are in the corpus — 52 citations exist upstream.References1988Anomalies: The Ultimatum Game19954. Bargaining Experiments1998Dictator game giving: Rules of fairness versus acts of kindness1996Fairness in Ultimatum Games with Asymmetric Information and Asymmetric Payoffs2001The Relevance of Equal Splits in Ultimatum Games2001Stackelberg Beats Cournot: On Collusion and Efficiency in Experimental Markets*1996Expectations and fairness in a modified Ultimatum game2007Individual versus group behavior and the role of the decision making procedure in gift-exchange experimentsCited by2009Understanding the influence of outcome valence in bargaining: A study on fairness accessibility, norms, and behavior2016Medial frontal negativity reflects advantageous inequality aversion of proposers in the ultimatum game: An ERP study2011Effort and Fairness in Bargaining Games2016Equity and bargaining power in ultimatum games