The Moral/Conventional Distinction

Abstract

Commonsense suggests that moral judgements and conventional normative judgements are importantly different in kind. Yet a compelling vindicating account of the moral/conventional distinction has proven persistently elusive. The distinction is typically explicated in terms of either formal properties (the Form View) or substantive properties (the Content View) of the principles that figure in the judgements. But the most promising versions of these views face serious difficulties. After reviewing the difficulties with the standard accounts, I propose a new way of explicating the moral/conventional distinction in terms of the role that social practices play in grounding the judgements (the Grounds View).

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