Cooperation, but No Reciprocity: Individual Strategies in the Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma

Yves Breitmoser

57 citations0/0 files storedAmerican Economic Review

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Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies Game Theory and Applications Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation

Abstract

In the repeated prisoner's dilemma, predictions are notoriously difficult. Recently, however, Blonski, Ockenfels, and Spagnolo (2011)—henceforth, BOS—showed that experimental subjects predictably cooperate when the discount factor exceeds a particular threshold. I analyze individual strategies in four recent experiments to examine whether strategies are predictable, too. Behavior is well summarized by “Semi-Grim” strategies: cooperate after mutual cooperation, defect after mutual defection, randomize otherwise. This holds both in aggregate and individually, and it explains the BOS-threshold: Semi-Grim equilibria appear as the discount factor crosses this threshold, and then, subjects start cooperating in round 1 and switch to Semi-Grim in continuation play. (JEL C72, C73, C92, D12)

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References

1962College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage 1994Job Creation and Job Destruction in the Theory of Unemployment 1975Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games 1977The “false consensus effect”: An egocentric bias in social perception and attribution processes 1995Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games 1962Individual Choice Behavior 1986The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information 1971A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames

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2020Reciprocity and informal institutions in international market entry 2023Mixed Strategies in the Indefinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma 2019The Evolution of Cooperation: The Role of Costly Strategy Adjustments 2019Experiments on Cognition, Communication, Coordination, and Cooperation in Relationships

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