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The Optimality of a Monetary Union without a Fiscal Union
12 references·6 citing·41 second hop
The Optimality of a Monetary Union without a Fiscal Union (2001)The Optimality of a Monetary Union withou…International risk sharing and European monetary unification (1998)International risk sharing an…Inflation Targets and Contracts with Uncertain Central Banker Preferences (1998)Inflation Targets and Contrac…Designing fiscal and monetary institutions in a second-best world (1997)Designing fiscal and monetary…Central Bank Independence (1996)Central Bank IndependenceOptimal Inflation Targets, `Conservative' Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts (1995)Optimal Inflation Targets, `C…Modern Approaches to Central Banking (1995)Modern Approaches to Central …Loss of monetary discretion in a simple dynamic policy game (1994)Loss of monetary discretion i…RULES AND DISCRETION WITH NONCOORDINATED MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICIES (1987)RULES AND DISCRETION WITH NON…The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target (1985)The Optimal Degree of Commitm…Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy (1983)Rules, discretion and reputat…A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural-Rate Model (1981)A Positive Theory of Monetary…A Theory of Optimum Currency Areas (1961)A Theory of Optimum Currency …Fiscal and Monetary Policy: Coordination or Conflict? (2018)Fiscal and Monetary Policy: C…On Policy Interactions Among Nations: When Do Cooperation and Commitment Matter? (2008)On Policy Interactions Among …Designing Macroeconomic Frameworks: A Positive Analysis of Monetary and Fiscal Delegation* (2005)Designing Macroeconomic Frame…Is fiscal policy coordination in EMU desirable? (2001)Is fiscal policy coordination…Is Fiscal Policy Coordination in EMU Desirable? (2001)Is Fiscal Policy Coordination…Central Bank Independence and the Design of Fiscal Institutions (2001)Central Bank Independence and…Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence (1993)Optimal contracts for central bankers (1995)The Political Economy of Central Bank Independence (1995)How transparant are Central Banks? (2006)Monetary Policy Strategy: Lessons from the Crisis (2011)Optimum Currency Areas (1991)No Single Currency Regime is Right for All Countries or At All Times (1999)Fear of Floating (2000)From Principles of Political Economy (2005)Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans (1977)Anticipated inflation and the capital stock in a cash in-advance economy (1981)Monetary union without fiscal coordination may discipline policymakers (1998)Interactions of Commitment and Discretion in Monetary and Fiscal Policies (2000)Mobile Capital, Domestic Institutions, and Electorally Induced Monetary and Fiscal Policy (2000)Domestic Saving and International Capital Flows (1980)Convergence Across States and Regions (1991)Economic integration, industrial specialization, and the asymmetry of macroeconomic fluctuations (2001)Home bias and international risk sharing: Twin puzzles separated at birth (2007)Does financial globalization promote risk sharing? (2008)Some Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic (1981)Some Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic (1984)The Discipline-Enhancing Role of Fiscal Institutions (2007)Fiscal Rules, Fiscal Councils and All that: Commitment Devices, Signaling Tools or Smokescreens? (2012)The case for fiscal rules (2016)Reputation and imperfect information (1982)International Norm Dynamics and Political Change (1998)The Science of Monetary Policy: A New Keynesian Perspective (1999)Varieties of Capitalism (2001)Channels of Interstate Risk Sharing: United States 1963-1990 (1996)Monetary Union Among Member Countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (2003)Fiscal Policy and Macroeconomic Stability (2010)MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICIES INTERACTION IN MONETARY UNIONS (2017)Some International Evidence on Output-Inflation Tradeoffs. (1973)"Rational" Expectations, the Optimal Monetary Instrument, and the Optimal Money Supply Rule (1975)Aggregate Dynamics and Staggered Contracts (1980)A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model (1983)Discretion versus policy rules in practice (1993)INTEREST AND PRICES: FOUNDATIONS OF A THEORY OF MONETARY POLICY (2005)Chapter 22 Political economics and macroeconomic policy (1999)Does monetary unification lead to excessive debt accumulation? (1999)Decision‐Based Methods for Forecast Evaluation (2004)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1961A Theory of Optimum Currency Areas4,546 cited
  • 1985The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target3,687 cited
  • 1983Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy3,625 cited
  • 1981A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural-Rate Model2,177 cited
  • 1995Optimal Inflation Targets, `Conservative' Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts593 cited
  • 1987RULES AND DISCRETION WITH NONCOORDINATED MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICIES401 cited
  • 1998International risk sharing and European monetary unification380 cited
  • 1998Inflation Targets and Contracts with Uncertain Central Banker Preferences78 cited
  • 1997Designing fiscal and monetary institutions in a second-best world47 cited
  • 1996Central Bank Independence46 cited
  • 1994Loss of monetary discretion in a simple dynamic policy game44 cited
  • 1995Modern Approaches to Central Banking39 cited

Cited by

  • 2001Is fiscal policy coordination in EMU desirable?58 cited
  • 2001Is Fiscal Policy Coordination in EMU Desirable?40 cited
  • 2008On Policy Interactions Among Nations: When Do Cooperation and Commitment Matter?37 cited

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  • 2001Central Bank Independence and the Design of Fiscal Institutions21 cited
  • 2018Fiscal and Monetary Policy: Coordination or Conflict?18 cited
  • 2005Designing Macroeconomic Frameworks: A Positive Analysis of Monetary and Fiscal Delegation*16 cited