ON RELATIVISM IN CONSTRUCTIVIST PSYCHOLOGY

Abstract

Many scholars criticize constructivist approaches to psychology for culminating in a nihilistic relativism. This article reviews the problem of relativism within personal construct psychology and social constructionism. It argues that labeling constructivist approaches to psychology as essentially relativist or nonrelativist simplifies the debate by assigning indisputable characteristics to a family of theories. Both relativist and nonrelativist interpretations of personal constructivism and social constructionism are presented in suggesting that the current terms of the relativism debate often hinder constructivists, who are forced to defend themselves against charges of relativism using objectivist terminology. Some common arguments about the advantages and disadvantages of constructivist relativism are outlined and discussed. Further, the implications of relativism for constructivist ethics and action are contemplated, with particular attention paid to the roles of commitment and hermeneutic understanding. The article concludes that, while constructivist psychologists may not agree on whether to endorse or reject relativism, in order to maintain the viability of the constructivist viewpoint, they need to be able to formulate thoughtful responses to those accusing them of relativism.

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