Facing reality—A critique of Karl Popper's empiricism

Abstract

Popper's epistemology is an attempt to RESOlve the difficulties which stem from the creation within philosophy of an abstract problem of knowledge via the antithesis of a knowing subject and a known real object. He attempts to RESOlve these difficulties by installing ‘controls’ on the knowing subject. But, even within the circle of his empiricist presuppositions, the operation of these controls is dependent upon a certain organisation of knowledge. And, more fundamentally, Popper always imposes his philosophical preconceptions about the nature of knowledge upon the theoretical discourses which he considers. Popper fails to establish the scientificity of the natural sciences and the non-scientificity of Marx and Freud.

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