Rhetoric for Realism in Psychology

Abstract

Greenwood's (1992) selection of arguments may be understood as being targeted at experimental psychologists. These arguments focus on empiricism's denial of meaningful theory, constructionism's denial of objectivity, and realism's avoidance of both, while allowing satisfactory insight into the social realm. I approve of Greenwood's approach, both its logic and its rhetoric, but I suggest some refinements. Greater attention to empiricist objections to realism, a different interpretation of the theory-ladenness of observations, and a firmer attack on the relativistic aspects of constructionism would make for a stronger argument.

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