Emotion Talk and Political Judgment

Abstract

Recent critics have argued that the concept of deliberation guiding much democratic theory is an overly rationalized one that undervalues the role of emotion in political communication. In this essay, I probe the puzzles of political judgment that come into view once we consider emotion a morally appropriate element of democratic communication. I argue that Aristotle’s understanding of reason, emotion, and rhetoric directs our attention to “emotion talk” and offers resources for illuminating the worldly effects of beliefs about emotion in a context of inequality. Reflecting on the effects of how we listen to emotion talk can provoke consideration of the citizen ethos we desire.

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