Central Bankers and Central Bank Independence

Miroslav Beblavý

13 citations0/0 files storedScottish Journal of Political Economy

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Monetary Policy and Economic Impact Banking stability, regulation, efficiency Global Financial Crisis and Policies

Abstract

Abstract This paper uses results of a questionnaire survey to look at how central bankers inthe Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia view various criteria of centralbank independence and compares their responses with central bankers in industrialcountries. Central bankers from both groups agree very strongly on the importanceof two pillars of central bank independence: goal independence and freedom toimplement these goals, together with a system of how credit is granted by a centralbank to a government that gives the central bank powers to determine terms andlimits the extent of such credit. Based on the responses, the paper also identifiessome weaknesses of the most frequently used indices of central bank independenceand makes recommendations on how to improve them.

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References

1991Political and Monetary Institutions and Public Financial Policies in the Industrial Countries 1999Checks and balances, and the supply of central bank independence 1998Measuring central bank independence: a tale of subjectivity and of its consequences 1998Central bank independence--conceptual clarifications and interim assessment 1996ON THE ASSESSMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF 'INSTITUTIONAL' REMEDIES 1999A State Within the State? An Event Study on the Bundesbank (1948–1973)1995Central bank independence: A critical view from a developing country perspective 2000Bureaucratic Delegation and Political Institutions: When Are Independent Central Banks Irrelevant?

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2012The link between central bank independence and inflation in Central and Eastern Europe: are the results sensitive to endogeneity issue omitted dynamics and subjectivity bias?2014Financial Independence of Central Bank through the Balance Sheet Prism

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