Resources Rent Taxation

Abstract

In the past, revenue from government owned mineral rights have been collected through a combination of lease auctions, ad valorem or per unit royalties, overcharges for state services, price controls and export levies. The resource rents tax (RRT) is a recently proposed royalty which purportedly has an efficiency advantage over other forms of rent collection. This paper critically reviews the arguments which have been used to justify RRT. Possible problems with RRT are discussed, some of which have been ignored in the current literature. In addition, a new royalty is introduced, which combines an auction with a two-part output-based levy.

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