The Nonobjectivist Critique of Moral Knowledge

Abstract

In Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy , Bernard Williams developed a subtle and intertwined set of arguments against a contemporary view that he called “objectivism.” Williams is on record as having confessed that some of that work is difficult to follow, partly because of his stylistic trait of presenting arguments in compressed and allusive forms. Certainly, the argument against objectivism is presented in a highly abstract way and while it is clear that a serious obstacle has been placed in the path of an objectivist view of the ethical, it is not entirely clear what that obstacle is. The aim of this paper is to contextualize Williams' arguments in order to bring out their main lines, to explain their inter-relations and to assess their overall cogency. I will argue that the only satisfactory way to respond to his profound challenge to an objectivist form of moral cognitivism is to adopt a certain approach to the underlying epistemology of morality, namely, inferential contextualism. For those who do believe that a core of ethical claims is indeed made up of claims to knowledge, contextualism offers the best way of deflecting Williams' criticisms while incorporating insights from his critique that no form of moral cognitivism ought to neglect. BETWEEN SUBJECTIVISM AND OBJECTIVISM It is possible to be more precise as to where, and how, Williams' arguments seem puzzling and in places to verge on the paradoxical.

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