Externality‐Correcting Taxes and Regulation*

Vidar Christiansen · Stephen Smith

48 citations0/0 files storedScandinavian Journal of Economics

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Economic Policies and Impacts Economic and Fiscal Studies Legal and Constitutional Studies

Abstract

Abstract In much of the literature on externalities, taxes and direct regulation have been considered as alternative policy instruments. Both instruments might be imperfect in practice, reflecting informational deficiencies and other limitations. We analyse the use of taxes and regulation in combination, to control externalities arising from individual consumption behaviour. We consider the cases either where taxes are imperfectly differentiated to reflect individual differences in externalities, or where some consumption escapes taxation. In both cases, we characterize the optimal instrument mix, and we show how changing the level of direct regulation alters the optimal externality tax.

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1974Prices vs. Quantities 1972Markets in licenses and efficient pollution control programs 1976The design of tax structure: Direct versus indirect taxation 1976Effluent charges and licenses under uncertainty 1953Complementarity and the Excess Burden of Taxation 2007Second-best theory and the use of multiple policy instruments 2001Environmental Taxation and Regulation 1984Which commodity taxes should supplement the income tax?

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