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Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships
9 references·16 citing·43 second hop
Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships (1991)Information and Timing in Repeated Partne…The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information (1994)The Folk Theorem with Imperfe…Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships (1990)Short-term contracts and long…On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting (1987)On Repeated Moral Hazard with…Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives (1987)Aggregation and Linearity in …The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information (1986)The Folk Theorem in Repeated …Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring (1986)Optimal cartel equilibria wit…Repeated Moral Hazard (1985)Repeated Moral HazardNoncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information (1984)Noncooperative Collusion unde…Monitoring Cooperative Agreements in a Repeated Principal-Agent Relationship (1981)Monitoring Cooperative Agreem…Approaches to the Economics of Discrimination (2025)Approaches to the Economics o…The Economic Returns to Social Interaction: Experimental Evidence from Microfinance (2013)The Economic Returns to Socia…Reputation for Quality (2013)Reputation for Quality25. Relational Incentive Contracts (2013)25. Relational Incentive Cont…Waiting for News in the Market for Lemons (2012)Waiting for News in the Marke…Private Monitoring and Communication in Cartels: Explaining Recent Collusive Practices (2011)Private Monitoring and Commun…Information feedback in a dynamic tournament (2010)Information feedback in a dyn…Contracting for Infrequent Restoration and Recovery of Mission-Critical Systems (2010)Contracting for Infrequent Re…Collusion as public monitoring becomes noisy: Experimental evidence (2008)Collusion as public monitorin…Reputations, Relationships, and Contract Enforcement (2007)Reputations, Relationships, a…Contracting with Repeated Moral Hazard and Private Evaluations (2007)Contracting with Repeated Mor…Financial Reporting in XBRL on the SEC's EDGAR System: A Critique and Evaluation (2005)Financial Reporting in XBRL o…Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games (2005)Belief-Free Equilibria in Rep…Introduction to Repeated Games with Private Monitoring (2002)Introduction to Repeated Game…Organizational Incentives and Organizational Mortality (2001)Organizational Incentives and…Communication in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring (1998)Communication in Repeated Gam…The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration (1986)The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (1986)The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (1987)Asset Specificity and the Structure of Vertical Relationships: Empirical Evidence (1988)Chapter 2 The theory of the firm (1989)Optimal Unemployment Insurance (1997)Moral Hazard and Observability (1979)The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems (1985)Implications of Efficient Risk Sharing without Commitment (1996)Optimal Lending Contracts and Firm Dynamics (2004)Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device (1986)Salaries and Piece Rates (1986)Optimal Indirect and Capital Taxation (2003)The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism (1970)Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. (1976)Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm (1980)Does Reputation Limit Opportunistic Behavior in the VC Industry? Evidence from Litigation against VCs (2012)Toward a unified theory of project governance: economic, sociological and psychological supports for relational contracting (2012)Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications (1981)Agency costs and innovation (1989)Risk Taking by Mutual Funds as a Response to Incentives (1997)The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model (2001)On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria (1986)On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting (1988)A Continuous-Time Version of the Principal–Agent Problem (2008)Formal Contracts in the Presence of Relational Enforcement Mechanisms: Evidence from Technology Development Projects (2009)Cognitive systems for revenge and forgiveness (2012)Stochastic Games (1953)A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames (1971)Solidarity Networks in Preindustrial Societies: Rational Peasants with a Moral Economy (1992)What Determines Cartel Success? (2006)Incentives in Teams (1973)Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games (1975)Chapter 27 Recent Developments in the Theory of Regulation (2007)Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance. (1971)Contract enforceability and economic institutions in early trade: The Maghribi Traders' Coalition (1993)Explaining Interethnic Cooperation (1996)Economic Analysis of Social Interactions (2000)Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma (1982)Reputation and imperfect information (1982)An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism (2001)Varieties of Capitalism (2001)Evolutionary games on graphs (2007)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1987Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives2,870 cited
  • 1986The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information2,375 cited
  • 1984Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information2,002 cited
  • 1994The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information768 cited
  • 1986Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring668 cited
  • 1987On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting641 cited
  • 1985Repeated Moral Hazard614 cited
  • 1990Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships484 cited
  • 1981Monitoring Cooperative Agreements in a Repeated Principal-Agent Relationship405 cited

Cited by

  • 2007Reputations, Relationships, and Contract Enforcement384 cited
  • 2013The Economic Returns to Social Interaction: Experimental Evidence from Microfinance292 cited
  • 1998Communication in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring254 cited
  • 2012Waiting for News in the Market for Lemons230 cited
  • 2007Contracting with Repeated Moral Hazard and Private Evaluations207 cited
  • 2025Approaches to the Economics of Discrimination177 cited

Only edges whose both ends are imported exist here. Widen the year window, or show the whole map. Back to the work

  • 2002Introduction to Repeated Games with Private Monitoring175 cited
  • 2010Information feedback in a dynamic tournament173 cited
  • 2011Private Monitoring and Communication in Cartels: Explaining Recent Collusive Practices167 cited
  • 2013Reputation for Quality161 cited
  • 2010Contracting for Infrequent Restoration and Recovery of Mission-Critical Systems157 cited
  • 2005Financial Reporting in XBRL on the SEC's EDGAR System: A Critique and Evaluation150 cited
  • 2005Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games142 cited
  • 2001Organizational Incentives and Organizational Mortality137 cited
  • 2008Collusion as public monitoring becomes noisy: Experimental evidence135 cited
  • 201325. Relational Incentive Contracts126 cited