Article2007

Managerial Ability, Compensation, and the Closed‐End Fund Discount

205 citations0/0 files storedThe Journal of Finance

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Financial Markets and Investment Strategies Corporate Finance and Governance Financial Analysis and Corporate Governance

Abstract

ABSTRACT This paper shows that the existence of managerial ability, combined with the labor contract prevalent in the industry, implies that the closed‐end fund discount should exhibit many of the primary features documented in the literature. We evaluate the model's ability to match the quantitative features of the data, and find that it does well, although there is some observed behavior that remains to be explained.

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References

1997On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance 1968THE PERFORMANCE OF MUTUAL FUNDS IN THE PERIOD 1945–1964 1987Stochastic Differential Equations: An Introduction with Applications.1980On estimating the expected return on the market 2004Mutual Fund Flows and Performance in Rational Markets 1991Investor Sentiment and the Closed-End Fund Puzzle 1991Investor Sentiment and the Closed‐End Fund Puzzle 2002Mutual Fund Flows and Performance in Rational Markets

Cited by

2015Does managerial ability facilitate corporate innovative success?2018Exchange-Traded Funds 101 for Economists 2014Managerial Ability, Investment Efficiency and Stock Price Crash Risk 2017It pays to write well 2009Activist arbitrage: A study of open-ending attempts of closed-end funds 2009Why Do Demand Curves for Stocks Slope Down?2015Bank Liquidity Creation and Risk‐Taking: Does Managerial Ability Matter?2012Closed-End Funds: A Survey

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