When Does Evolution Lead to Efficiency in Communication Games

Karl H. Schlag

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Game Theory and Applications Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation

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* I would especially like to thank two referees and an associated editor for their comments that lead to splitting the original paper (Schlag [1993]) into two separate papers and consequently strengthening the results. I would also like to thank Avner Shaked for comments on an earlier version. Financial support by Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, Sonderforschungsbereich 303 is gratefully acknowledged. Comments welcome!

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1988Evolution and the Theory of Games 1978Evolutionary stable strategies and game dynamics 1995Learning to be imperfect: The ultimatum game 1990Efficiency in evolutionary games: Darwin, nash and the secret handshake 1992Best response dynamics and socially stable strategies 1985On evolutionarily stable sets 1979Evolutionarily stable strategies with two types of player 1995An Evolutionary Approach to Pre-Play Communication

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2003The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure

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