Existence of stability in hedonic coalition formation games

Abstract

• A player’s appreciation of a coalition structure (partition) only depends on the coalition he is a member of ‣ Many applications in social, economic and political settings: social net-works, company merging, matching markets, etc. ‣ Questions: How to model stability in hedonic games? What conditions guarantee the existence of stable outcomes? Stable Partitions • Notation: N is the set of players and ∏(i) is the coalition of player i in partition ∏. • Different ways to define stability ‣ A partition is strong Nash stable (SNS) if there exists no set S of play-ers who can deviate in any way they want such that each player in S is strictly happier [Karakaya, 2011]. ‣ A partition is strict strong Nash stable (SSNS) if there exists no set S of players who can deviate in any way they want such that each player in

Cite this work

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 56 citations exist upstream.

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.