Stable matchings for resource allocation in wireless networks

Abstract

In this paper, we apply and extend the theory of one-to-one and many-to-one matching markets to the resource allocation in wireless communications. We develop a general framework to find stable matchings of users and resources based on the channel and context aware preference lists of users and resources. The score-based, maximum throughput, and proportional fair scheduler do not lead necessarily to a stable matching. We apply the user and resource proposing deferred acceptance algorithm in order to find stable matchings and to identify their properties. If the preference lists of users and resources are strict and based on the same information, e.g., the channel state, the stable matching is always unique. The optimality properties of stable matchings are characterized. The framework is illustrated by an example ad-hoc communications scenario.

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