Threat of a capital levy, expected devaluation and interest rates in France during the interwar period

Abstract

In this paper we try to isolate and measure the respective importance of political and economic aspects in two critical episodes of France interwar. We do this by separating expectations of taxation and of devaluation that are implicitly included in the prices of various categories of French and foreign bonds. Concerning the 1924–26 crisis, we show first that there was no expectation of a government default; second that the rise of interest rates in 1925 results from expectations of a capital levy; third that no hyperinflation was ever expected. After stabilisation, we show that the markets expected an appreciation of the franc up to 1931 and a devaluation afterwards.

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