Deception in Social Psychological Experiments: Two Misconceptions and a Research Agenda

Abstract

n Constructing the Subject,Kurt Danziger(1990) traces the history of psychologyOsresearch methodology from the nineteenthcentury to the emergence of modern rules ofexperimentation; the changes are striking. IntodayOs psychology laboratories, there is astrict division of labor. One is either anexperimenter or a participant, but neverbothNat least, not in the same laboratory.Not so in Wilhelm WundtOs laboratory at theUniversity of Leipzig, the dedication ofwhich in 1879 is generally recognized as thebirth of modern experimental psychology. InWundtOs laboratory, the roles of participantand experimenter were fluid, and laboratorymembers took on both roles. Wundt himselfparticipated regularly as a subject in theexperiments published by his students; healso contributed much of the underlying the-ory. That this giant himself served as a datasource and rarely, if ever, as an experimentersuggests that the role of subject was thoughtto require greater psychological sophistica-tion than that of experimenter.Retracing the history of oneOs disciplinehelps demonstrate that its practices of exper-imentation are also a product of its times,notwithstanding often deeply entrenchedbeliefs to the contrary. Deception of partici-pants is an experimental tool about whichmany currently harbor strong beliefs; some,for instance, deem it indispensable (e.g.,Brsder 1998; Kimmel 1998). In WundtOs lab-oratory, deception was impossible.Researchers at the Leipzig laboratory wouldfunction as participants, experimenters, andtheorists for one another. Deception wouldhave meant self-deception or deception ofclose collaborators. One does not have totravel in time, however, to realize that a dis-ciplineOs preferred practices of experimenta-tion are relative. Sometimes glancing beyondthe fence of oneOs discipline suffices. In lab-oratories of experimental economists, the useof deception is essentially impossiblebecause the community has effectively pro-scribed it (although there are rare excep-tions). Economists fear that participantsOexpectations of being deceived trigger suspi-cion and second-guessing, and that theseresponses swamp the impact of the experi-mental scenario on behavior (see Hertwigand Ortmann 2001, 2003; Ortmann andHertwig 2002).Having established that beliefs about therules of experimentation evolve and differacross disciplines, we discuss two wide-spread misconceptions about the contempo-rary use of deception in psychology andsketch a research agenda for the future.Before we do so, however, let us briefly clar-ify what is typically considered to be decep-tion. Although deception is not easilydefined, a consensus has emerged acrossdisciplinary borders that intentional andexplicit provision of erroneous informa-tionNin other words, lyingNis deception,whereas withholding information aboutresearch hypotheses, the range of experi-mental manipulations, or the like ought notto count as deception. In the words of theeconomist Hey (1998:397), Othere is a worldof difference between not telling subjectsthings and telling them the wrong things.The latter is deception, the former is notO

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