References

• 1987Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives2,870 cited
• 1990Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring1,207 cited
• 2003Relational Incentive Contracts1,103 cited
• 1994The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information768 cited
• 2006Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships674 cited
• 2006Notes on Welfare Economics, Information, and Uncertainty391 cited
• 1991Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships317 cited
• 1976Essays on Economic Behavior Under Uncertainty.294 cited
• 1983Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite- and infinite-horizon games248 cited
• 1994Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players177 cited
• 1990Repeated Games with Long-Run and Short-Run Players156 cited
• 2002Discrete-Time Approximations of the Holmstrom-Milgrom Brownian-Motion Model of Intertemporal Incentive Provision115 cited
• 2007Impossibility of Collusion under Imperfect Monitoring with Flexible Production97 cited
• 2010The Role of Information in Repeated Games With Frequent Actions65 cited
• 2007Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient56 cited