"Staying Private": Gaining Congressional Support for Unpublicized Presidential Preferences on Roll Call Votes

Abstract

Presidents are known to have strong incentives to publicize their positions on legislation before the Congress. This paper examines the obverse of that proposition: that under appropriate circumstances, presidents have strong incentives not to publicize their positions. Data from the Kennedy and Johnson presidencies uncover 36 instances of unpublicized presidential preferences. The paper rejects apolitical explanations for their existence, and then presents four political reasons why presidents might avoid publicly expressing their views. Tests of inferences about congressional voting behavior based on those reasons are formulated, and the findings conform to the expectations. On the basis of those findings, I argue for additional research that examines various facets of the process by which presidents influence the Congress.

Cite this work

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 91 citations exist upstream.

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.