Central Bank Independence in Korea

Abstract

legal independence of the Bank of Korea, imposing an inflation-target framework, confining the responsibilities of the Bank of Korea to price stability, and transferring the supervisory function to a separate and newly established Financial Services Commission. The objective of the paper is to place the redesign of the Bank of Korea in the context of financial change in Korea, in the context of international developments in central bank institutional design, and in the context of similar changes in central bank institutional redesign in Japan. As part of this review, the paper evaluates the degree to which the Bank of Korea's independence was enhanced by the 1997 revision and evaluates the practical impact of the revision on central bank policy.

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