The Lottery Paradox and the Pragmatics of Belief

Igor Douven

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Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics Philosophical Ethics and Theory Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge

Abstract

The thesis that high probability suffices for rational belief, while initially plausible, is known to face the Lottery Paradox. The present paper proposes an amended version of that thesis which escapes the Lottery Paradox. The amendment is argued to be plausible on independent grounds.

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References

2000Knowledge and Its Limits 2002Knowledge and its Limits 1982Linguistic Communication and Speech Acts.2000Presumptive Meanings 2003Inference to the Best Explanation 2000Some Aspects of Optimality in Natural Language Interpretation 2008Further Notes on Logic and Conversation 2002Belief's Own Ethics

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2020Knowledge Attributions and Lottery Cases: A Review and New Evidence 2021Rational Belief in Lottery- and Preface-Situations 2021Knowledge Attributions and Lottery Cases

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