A Comparative Theory of Electoral Incentives

Abstract

We expand Denzau and Munger’s 1986 model of ‘How Unorganized Interests Get Represented’ to address cross-national differences in electoral systems. We look at how individual legislators allocate their efforts to serving unorganized constituents versus organized groups. Our model shows how the optimal allocation of effort is affected by differences in nominating processes and electoral rules. Our findings include the following: (1) Closed-list proportional representation (PR) makes legislators generally more responsive to interest groups and less responsive to unorganized voters than single-member districts (SMD). (2) This difference becomes smaller as the personal component of the SMD vote diminishes. (3) Legislators elected via lists in a mixed system may be even less responsive to the unorganized than legislators in a pure list system.

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