Constraining external governance: interdependence with Russia and the CIS as limits to the EU's rule transfer in the Ukraine

Abstract

The question of how effective the EU's external governance is cannot be answered without looking at the broader geographical and historical framework in which the Union extends its influence. We argue that interdependence between Ukraine and Russia in several key aspects shapes the context within which the EU and Russia compete to export their policies. Based on an analysis comparing the institutional rules underpinning the EU's external governance and the CIS rules as well as several sectoral analyses, we show that the effectiveness of external governance varies with patterns of interdependence. We identify sectoral differences in the extent of Ukraine's interdependence with Russia: it is low and receding in trade; medium in foreign policy and high in energy.

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