Cooperation in Asymmetric Social Dilemmas When Equality Is Perceived as Unfair1

Abstract

Three experiments examined the hypothesis that in an asymmetric social dilemma, perceived fairness of the distribution promotes cooperation. In support of the hypothesis, Studies 1 and 2 showed that willingness to voluntarily and anonymously pay for child care was related to ratings of perceived fairness of equal and equitable distributions of the quality of child care when it was a public good (provided by the municipality) or a market good (provided by a private business). Study 1 also showed that an equal distribution of the public good was perceived to be fairer than an equal distribution of the market good, whereas the reverse was true for an equitable distribution. Study 2 showed that when quality differences were explicit, an equitable distribution was perceived as fairer than an equal distribution. Study 3 showed that an equitable distribution of quantity of child care was perceived to be fairer and increased willingness to pay as compared to an equal distribution.

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