Articlegreen2007

Conditional Cash Transfers, Public Provision of Private Goods, and Income Redistribution

46 citations0/0 files storedAmerican Economic Review

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Poverty, Education, and Child Welfare Income, Poverty, and Inequality Gender, Labor, and Family Dynamics

Abstract

This paper examines the role of cash transfers as a screening device when combined with in-kind transfers. It shows that linking in-kind to cash transfers makes first-best redistribution possible despite the government's inability to tell rich and poor individuals apart. Moreover, the maximal attainable welfare for the poor can be pushed beyond its first-best level by distorting downward the quality of the indivisible good the poor receive relative to the cash value of their net transfers. Using in-kind transfers alone, as in Besley and Coate (1991), leads to a third-best solution. (JEL D31, H23, H41)

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References

2019American Economic Review 1971An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation 1983An Economic Model of Welfare Stigma 2000Does Child Labour Displace Schooling? Evidence on Behavioural Responses to an Enrollment Subsidy 2005Evaluating the Impact of Conditional Cash Transfer Programs 1992Workfare versus Welfare Incentive Arguments for Work Requirements in Poverty-Alleviation Programs 2004Decentralized targeting of an antipoverty program 1982Targeting Transfers through Restrictions on Recipients

Cited by

2021Redistribution Through Markets 2016The impact of a conditional cash transfer programme on determinants of child health: evidence from Colombia 2013Antipoverty Transfers and Labour Force Participation Effects 2007Chapter 62 Evaluating Conditional Schooling and Health Programs

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