Gender and Psychological Essentialism

Abstract

When individuals reason in an essentialist way about social categories, they assume that group differences reflect inherently different natures (Gelman, 2003; Rothbart & Taylor, 1992). This paper describes the psychological and social implications of essentialist beliefs, and examines the extent to which children exhibit psychological essentialism when reasoning about gender. The authors discuss reasons young children as well as older children show essentialist reasoning in some contexts, but not in others. Finally, the authors suggest directions for future research, and discuss a primary challenge to many working in this field: reduction of rigid gender beliefs.

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