First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions with Secret Reservation Prices

Elyakime · Laffont · Loisel · Vuong

165 citations0/0 files storedAnnales d Économie et de Statistique

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Auction Theory and Applications Art History and Market Analysis Game Theory and Voting Systems

Abstract

Bernard Elyakime, Jean Jacques Laffont, Patrice Loisel, Quang Vuong, First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions with Secret Reservation Prices, Annales d'Économie et de Statistique, No. 34, Économétrie de la concurrence imparfaite / Econometrics of Imperfect Competition (Apr. - Jun., 1994), pp. 115-141

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1984A complete solution to a class of principal-agent problems with an application to the control of a self-managed firm 1988An Empirical Study of an Auction with Asymmetric Information 1992Deciding between the common and private value paradigms in empirical models of auctions

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