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An empirical approach to the optimal size of the civil service
16 references·0 citing·45 second hop
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References

  • 1971Bureaucracy and Representative Government5,197 cited
  • 1979Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models1,484 cited
  • 1978Political resource allocation, controlled agendas, and the status quo1,162 cited
  • 2003The Size of Nations1,100 cited
  • 1998Property Rights, Corruption and the Allocation of Talent: a General Equilibrium Approach622 cited
  • 1983Tests of a rational theory of the size of government367 cited
  • 1984Uncovered Sets and Sophisticated Voting Outcomes with Implications for Agenda Institutions355 cited
  • 1997Corruption and the Rate of Temptation: Do Low Wages in the Civil Service Cause Corruption?308 cited
  • 1983Gatekeeping and Monopoly Power of Committees: An Analysis of Sincere and Sophisticated Behavior269 cited
  • 2003Determinants of Economic Corruption: A Cross-Country Comparison244 cited
  • 1975The Equilibrium Size of a Budget-maximizing Bureau: A Note on Niskanen's Theory of Bureaucracy237 cited
  • 1978The rational voter: an analysis of two Atlanta referenda on rapid transit103 cited
  • 1988Formal Models of Bureaucracy97 cited
  • 1990The simple analytics of slack-maximizing bureaucracy83 cited
  • 1987Stacking the Deck: Bureaucratic Missions and Policy Design

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  • 1985Why so much stability? The impact of agency determined stability24 cited
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