Article2011

War, Moral Hazard, and Ministerial Responsibility: England After the Glorious Revolution

91 citations0/0 files storedThe Journal of Economic History

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Political and Economic history of UK and US Historical Economic and Social Studies Fiscal Policies and Political Economy

Abstract

I reexamine Douglass North and Barry Weingast's argument regarding credible commitment and sovereign debt in post-revolution England. The central problem that the architects of the revolution settlement had to solve, I argue, was not the king's frequent reneging on financial commitments (a symptom), but the moral hazard that generated the kings' malfeasance (the underlying cause). The central element of the revolution settlement was thus not better holding kings to their commitments, but better holding royal advisors to account for all consequences of the Crown's policies—through what we now call ministerial responsibility.

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References

1989Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England 1995Rationalist explanations for war 2002Veto Players 2003Veto Players. How Political Institutions Work 1996Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange 2019Of Rule and Revenue 1999Bargaining Theory with Applications 1992Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War

Cited by

2012Was the Glorious Revolution a Constitutional Watershed?2013Empirical Research on Sovereign Debt and Default 2014The Long Process of Development: Building Markets and States in Pre-industrial England, Spain and their Colonies 2014Is Africa Different? Historical Conflict and State Development

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