Taxes and Voting: Electoral Retribution in the American States

Abstract

We examine the impacts of legislated changes in and new programs of general sales and personal income tax policies on the electoral support for the gubernatorial nominee of the responsible party in 407 gubernatorial elections in the 50 American states from 1957-1985. We propose a taxpayer retribution hypothesis in the context of a general model of retrospective voting. We estimate the effects of several tax policy variables while controlling for rival political and economic factors that are believed to influence voting at this level--state and national economic conditions, partisan strength, national trends, and coterminous contests. Results indicate weak overall negative electoral effects of taxation; only changes in the general sales tax programs appear to have significant impacts. Further, while voters may punish taxing governors, there appears to be no complementary reward for governors who decrease taxes.

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