WHY ECONOMIC REFORMS FAIL IN THE SOVIET SYSTEM–A PROPERTY RIGHTS‐BASED APPROACH

Abstract

Why do economic reforms fail in Soviet‐type system despite the obvious interest of ruling groups in improving the performance of their ailing economies? The author applies a property rights based analysis stressing modes of rent‐maximization by ruling groups as a crucial explanatory variable. Party apparatchiks and economic bureaucrats‐particularly benefit from persistent interference in the economic sphere and consequently are most interested in maintaining the status quo. The author surveys the impact of these motivations on the content of economic reforms, outlines the strategies of counterreformers and predicts the future of reforms in Soviet‐type economies.

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