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Justifying Conditionalization: Conditionalization Maximizes Expected Epistemic Utility
3 references·16 citing·39 second hop
Justifying Conditionalization: Conditionalization Maximizes Expected Epistemic Utility (2006)Justifying Conditionalization: Conditiona…Betting on Theories (1993)Betting on TheoriesLaws and symmetry (1989)Laws and symmetryProbability and Evidence. (1973)Probability and Evidence.Why Ideal Epistemology? (2021)Why Ideal Epistemology?Rational Polarization (2021)Rational PolarizationRational endorsement (2017)Rational endorsementLockeans Maximize Expected Accuracy (2017)Lockeans Maximize Expected Ac…Epistemic Utility Theory and the Aim of Belief (2017)Epistemic Utility Theory and …Conditionalization Does Not (in General) Maximize Expected Accuracy (2017)Conditionalization Does Not (…Uniqueness and Metaepistemology (2016)Uniqueness and Metaepistemolo…An Accuracy Based Approach to Higher Order Evidence (2016)An Accuracy Based Approach to…Immoderately rational (2013)Immoderately rationalExpected Accuracy Supports Conditionalization—and Conglomerability and Reflection (2013)Expected Accuracy Supports Co…Epistemic Decision Theory (2013)Epistemic Decision TheoryAn Objective Justification of Bayesianism II: The Consequences of Minimizing Inaccuracy (2010)An Objective Justification of…An Objective Justification of Bayesianism I: Measuring Inaccuracy (2010)An Objective Justification of…What is the “Equal Weight View”? (2009)What is the “Equal Weight Vie…Locating IBE in the Bayesian framework (2008)Locating IBE in the Bayesian …Accuracy and Coherence: Prospects for an Alethic Epistemology of Partial Belief (2008)Accuracy and Coherence: Prosp…The Logic of Scientific Discovery. (1959)The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1963)A rational analysis of the selection task as optimal data selection. (1994)HARKing: Hypothesizing After the Results are Known (1998)Blackwell Handbook of Judgment and Decision Making (2004)Theory of games and economic behavior (2019)Fact, Fiction, and Forecast. (1955)Minnesota studies in the philosophy of science (1956)Inference to the Best Explanation (2003)Bayesianism and Inference to the Best Explanation (2013)Explanatoriness is evidentially irrelevant, or inference to the best explanation meets Bayesian confirmation theory (2013)Reason and Explanation: A Defense of Explanatory Coherentism (2014)Laws and Symmetry (1989)Logic of Scientific Discovery, The (2010)The Logic of Scientific Discovery (2013)Dr. Truthlove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Bayesian Probabilities* (2015)Objective Knowledge, an Evolutionary Approach. (1973)OBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE: AN EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH (1973)A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance (1980)Scientific reasoning: the Bayesian approach (1990)A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism (1998)An Epistemic Nonconsequentialism (2020)The Logic of Decision (1965)The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory (1999)Epistemic Rationality as Instrumental Rationality: A Critique (2003)Epistemic Consequentialism (2018)Knowledge and Its Limits (2000)Knowledge and its Limits (2002)Predictably irrational: the hidden forces that shape our decisions (2008)Belief and credence: why the attitude-type matters (2018)Conversational Pressure (2020)Scorekeeping in a language game (1979)Evidence: A Guide for the Uncertain (2019)Humean Supervenience debugged (1999)How Models Are Used to Represent Reality (2004)Truth and Truthmakers (2004)Individual differences in reasoning: Implications for the rationality debate? (2000)Representativeness Revisited: Attribute Substitution in Intuitive Judgment (2002)The Affect Heuristic (2002)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1989Laws and symmetry1,274 cited
  • 1993Betting on Theories455 cited
  • 1973Probability and Evidence.414 cited

Cited by

  • 2008Accuracy and Coherence: Prospects for an Alethic Epistemology of Partial Belief332 cited
  • 2010An Objective Justification of Bayesianism I: Measuring Inaccuracy247 cited
  • 2010An Objective Justification of Bayesianism II: The Consequences of Minimizing Inaccuracy240 cited
  • 2016Uniqueness and Metaepistemology166 cited
  • 2013Epistemic Decision Theory159 cited
  • 2017Lockeans Maximize Expected Accuracy144 cited
  • 2008Locating IBE in the Bayesian framework143 cited
  • 2013Immoderately rational119 cited
  • 2016An Accuracy Based Approach to Higher Order Evidence110 cited
  • 2021Rational Polarization108 cited
  • 2017Rational endorsement107 cited
  • 2017Epistemic Utility Theory and the Aim of Belief95 cited
  • 2013Expected Accuracy Supports Conditionalization—and Conglomerability and Reflection92 cited

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2021
Why Ideal Epistemology?
91 cited
  • 2017Conditionalization Does Not (in General) Maximize Expected Accuracy87 cited
  • 2009What is the “Equal Weight View”?86 cited